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Abstract  
 The main objective of an economic system is to help people in 
satisfying the basic necessities of life without compromising an individual’s 
freedom. However, almost every society in the world depicts a clear division 
among people. Some individuals have access to all facilities required for a 
decent life, while others are excluded from having such facilities. This paper 
focuses on testing whether this is the case with the judicial system of Pakistan. 
Based on the philosophical approach towards life, this paper assumes that the 
foundation on which the current judicial system has been evolved is exclusive 
in its nature. The paper attempts to show that the exclusive nature of the 
judiciary cannot become inclusive until we bring the philosophy of the current 
economic system in line with reality. The paper claims that the philosophy of 
the current economic system protects the interest of rich and wealthy people. 
Hence, all sub-systems such as political, judicial, and executive mainly 
facilitate and promote the welfare of rich people.  The final outcome is in favor 
of those who are wealthy and have high intercept in the society in terms of 
money and social capital (links with influential people such as 
politicians/bureaucrats/army generals, etc.). On the other hand, the intuitional 
framework of the judiciary is less likely to help those who fall into the group 
of people who do not have money and social capital. The paper test the 
presumptions empirically based on the primary data collected from Lawyers 
in the district courts of Islamabad. Here we compare the cost of various types 
of cases across courts with the average income of an average family. The 
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average cost of almost all types of cases is higher than the average income of 
an average family. This shows the excludability of the judicial structure of 
Pakistan. The average family income is calculated from Household Integrated 
Economics Survey (HIES). The study suggests that a judicial structure with 
the agents having primary objective of settling the disputes of people are 
required. The current structure has flaw as it link earnings with the disputes of 
people. We need a society where the ills of one such as diseases, disputes, 
weakness, etc., should not become the source of earning for others. The study 
also claims that until we develop such a society, the true spirit of justice will 
remain a mere dream for the excluded people. 
 
Keywords: Justice, Excludability, courts, judiciary, lawyers 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 Neoclassical school of thought assumes that individuals are efficient 
enough to solve their problems without the support of others. That is, the 
motive of private interest is enough to provide a solution for the problems in 
society. According to this theory, an individual interacts with others provided 
that such interaction is beneficial to both of them. However, mutually 
beneficial interaction is possible in market exchanges where both sides enjoy 
some surplus benefits. Conflicts are like a negative-sum game; therefore, it is 
the responsibility of the society to provide a mechanism for its early 
settlements to avoid loss of efficiency. All organized society of the world has, 
thus, assigned the tasks of disputes settlement to an institution called judiciary.  
 The primary objective of any judiciary in society is to help people in 
settling their disputes within a short period of time with low or no cost. 
However, the philosophy of neoclassical economics has played a key role in 
the development of a judicial system across the world in general and Pakistan 
in particular. Pakistan owned British law (India Act, 1935) and, after some 
amendments, they have enforced it since independence. Therefore, the 
organizational structure of the judiciary and the rules of almost all its 
constituents are obtained from the rules of the British system. In the current 
judicial system, people involved in disputes are allowed to seek the solution 
based on the market forces. In other words, the forces of demand and supply 
are working in the attainment of justice. 
 The market between a lawyer and client bears most of the attributes of 
any other goods market, and this makes justice like a commodity which only 
the rich can afford. Thus, this resulted in a significant increase in the likelihood 
of the ratio of excluded people from having access to justice. To test the 
hypothesis of our work, we collected primary data from the district courts of 
Islamabad. The collected data were analyzed to calculate the level of exclusion 
of people who have no access to justice. 
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2.0 Literature Review 
 Lawyer’s fee is an important factor of the cost of litigation. 
Worthington and Baker (1993) conducted a study in Australia to identify the 
cost of litigation. Their main focus was on the lawyer’s fee for the defendant 
and forthe plaintiff. They collected the data of 100 firms from New South 
Wales and Victoria. They also calculated the average cost bore by the 
defendants and litigants. For litigant, the median fee of a lawyer was $4,700 
and $6,000 in New South Wales and Victoria respectively. The mean fee of 
the lawyer for litigant was $7,500 and $10,650 in New South Wales and 
Victoria respectively. The defendants face the median lawyer fee which 
amounted to $4,200 in New South Wales and $8,000 in Victoria. Mean fee for 
defendant in New South Wales was $9,000 and $11,450 in Victoria. It can be 
observed easily that the defendant pays a higher fee than litigant. The 
uniqueness of this study is that it finds the statistics for litigants and defendants 
separately.  They also compared cost and benefits for both parties. Plaintiffs’ 
cost was 29% and 26% of what they got in return, respectively. They also 
observed that the higher the benefit is attached, the higher the cost in absolute 
terms. However, when it was calculated in the relative terms, as the amount 
recovered increases the relative cost decreases. 
 A lawyer’s fee is an important part of the cost of litigation, but there 
are also other costs included in the cost of justice. Researchers also focused 
on these types of costs as Kakalik and Pace (1986) estimated the total cost of 
tort litigation in America in 1985. He estimated the cost of all types bore by 
the plaintiff, defendant, operating costs of the courts, and the cost faced by 
insurance companies. They used two different methods to get estimates. The 
first method was “starting with insurance industry aggregate data on direct 
losses and expenses paid in 1985, adding self-insurance, and then separating 
out payments for claims that were not lawsuits.” They got second estimates 
“from the bottom up, starting with data from surveys of individual tort 
lawsuits, appropriately adjusting the numbers to 1985, and then multiplying 
it by the number of tort lawsuits terminated.” The yearly expenses of all 
types of tort litigation are from $29 billion to $36 billion for defendants. The 
total cost is from $8 to $10 billion, of which $4.7 to $5.7 billion is paid to 
lawyers including other related expenses.  There is also $0.8 billion for 
insurance company claim and $2.5 to $3.5 billion for time cost and other 
expenses. 
 Plaintiffs’ total cost is in the range of $6 to $8 billion. The time cost 
accounts for almost $1 billion. $7,300 to $8,800 is paid by the plaintiffs for 
lawsuit legal expenses.  This is almost 31% of the total amount he receives in 
the context of the claim. Plaintiff receives $21 to $25 billion in total, of which 
he gets $14 to $16 billion in the net. To transfer this net compensation to the 
litigant, the system consumes the amount of $16 to $19 billion (including all 
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types of expenses), of which, $11 to $13 billion is the total of litigant and 
plaintiffs expenses. The fees paid to courts in the context of tort litigation are 
$0.5 billion and $4 to $5 billion is the total time cost. The plaintiff receives 
56% of total expenses occurred by all parties. The cost faced by the defendant 
is higher than the litigant and the case is like Australia (the study of 
Worthington and Baker). These findings are consistent with the previous ones 
in terms of cost-benefit analysis as well (29% and 31% cost-benefit ratio is 
almost the same). The public expenditure is very small as compared to the 
overall private expenditure for tort litigation. 
 The cost to the clients and what they get in return is also investigated 
(benefit of litigation). Trubek et al. (1983) examined the factors affecting the 
time spent by lawyers in different cases. For this purpose, they collected the 
data from lawyers (survey) and CLRP (Civil Litigation research project) from 
the USA. There are two types of lawyers: I) Those who charge an an hourly 
basis; II) Those who charge regardless of time. Time was used as the 
dependent variable to check the effect of 29 different variables for both 
models. The R2 for an hourly lawyer was 0.45 and 0.35 fora non-hourly 
lawyer. This means that the same factors have more effect in regards to the 
hourly lawyers than the non-hourly lawyers. These results show that lawyers 
are selfish.  They also investigated that the litigation “pays” by recovery to fee 
ratio tool. The plaintiffs get more benefit than the cost they bore. Plaintiffs 
also receive something (net benefit) in 89% of cases.  Although not all, most 
of the defendant also got more benefits than cost. However, the defendant’s 
results do not follow a pattern. In the case of recoveries under $10,000, the 
fees and the recovery are almost equal. Nevertheless, in the case where 
recoveries are more than $10,000, the recovery exceeds the fees paid to the 
lawyers. The study also explains the complaining behavior of society. They 
found out that 71.8% of people complained against the defendant party and 
63% of cases reached a dispute, while the remaining cases were solved 
mutually. 11.2% of cases were filed in the courts. They also found out the 
dispute concerning the amount of $1,000, and only 10% are filed to the court. 
The remaining 90% are resolved mutually without filing to the court.  Most 
filed cases were “post-divorce” cases and these are 59% of overall litigation. 
28% of cases were solved by investing 8-24 hours totally on cases by the 
lawyers. 
 As far as it is a question of the net benefit of the plaintiff, in this regard, 
the above three studies have shown that the litigation is beneficial to the 
plaintiff and it seems to be a reasonable allocation of his resources. For 
defendants, the calculations do not follow a specific pattern and these are 
depicting the blur picture of the scenario. Basically, the defendant does not 
initiate a case, but he is compelled to be involved and the main concern of the 
defendant should be to minimize his cost. This is why it is a challenge to 
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calculate the cost-benefit ratio for the defendant. The defendant’s interest 
should be involved quickly which would lead to a cheap termination of the 
case. 
 In addition, researchers discussed monetary cost as well as non-
monetary cost. Semple (2015) examined the private cost of civil justice, the 
time required to solve cases of different nature, and health cost as well. For 
this purpose, he conducted interviews on 250 litigants which involved 
different types of cases from Ontario, British Columbia, and Alberta. The 
lawyers charge on an average from $204 to $386 per hour. He claimed that 
this fee is about 50% higher than the fees charged in Canada. He also argued 
that the monetary cost, which is the most dominated part, is the fee of lawyers. 
The time required to solve a case varies from case to case. 23% out of the cases 
related to land/house and 55% out of all cases related to personal injuries 
prolonged for more than 3 years. More so, 27% of respondents of family cases 
reported that it took more than a year to resolve a problem. Clients are also 
faced with some psychological issues, and 79.9% sentiments were negative 
like damages to relatives, anger, stress, humiliation, hopelessness, and 
frustration. 34% of family lawyers said that they provide services free of 
charge. Furthermore, he suggested the initiatives at the public and private level 
which are required to reduce this cost. Public sector initiatives are like 
restrictions on the lawyers’ fee and it increases the competition. The objective 
of the private initiative is to understand the legal structure, attain legal 
education, and understand how to deal with their cases themselves. 
 
3.0 Theoretical Framework 
 Neoclassical school of thought explains that the market is a better place 
for the efficient allocation of resources. Individuals show their willingness to 
pay in the market through demand, and supplier shows their willingness for 
acceptance through supply. The optimal outcome is seen when the goods flow 
towards those who need it the most. This will result in competition in the 
market for the goods. This competition will exclude those whose willingness 
to pay is low, therefore leaving space for those whose willingness to pay is 
high. On the other side of the market, competition among suppliers will 
exclude those whose willingness to accept is high and leaving space for those 
whose willingness to accept is low. This process will create a match 
(equilibrium) between suppliers with the low willingness of acceptance and 
high willingness to pay. Thus, this produces a surplus which is enjoyed by 
those who are willing to pay more but in reality, they pay less.  This is also 
related to those whose willingness to accept is low but in reality, they receive 
more than that. In exercising justice in the market, there is a demand side 
(litigants) for those seeking justice and who are willing to pay the price for it. 
On the other hand, there is a supply side (producer) in the form of lawyers who 
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are willing to produce justice with some given price. The competition among 
litigants increases the willingness to pay, and the competition among suppliers 
decreases the willingness to accept. Hence, equilibrium is reached at a level 
where only those that can achieve access to justice pay the price. All those 
people who are in the demand pool but cannot pay the equilibrium price are 
excluded from having access to justice.  
 Figure 1 shows the market equilibrium, and the demand for justice 
comes from the consumer’s (client/litigant) side. The supply of justice comes 
from the producer of justice (lawyers). Therefore, one can raise the question 
that since lawyers are not the direct producers of justice, but are facilitators, 
why then are they regarded as suppliers? The answer to this question shows 
that it is true that they are not direct producers of justice, but without their 
help, the demand side on an average cannot achieve justice in the judicial 
structure of Pakistan. Hence, we term them as suppliers. The price of access 
to justice is determined by the market equilibrium. Those people that can 
afford the price are provided access to justice, while the rest are denied justice. 
Thus, they are excluded from the market.   
 
Figure 1. Equilibrium of a Commodity Market 
 
 It is also worth mentioning that the above analysis is true if there is the 
existence of competition. However, the market of justice does not fulfill the 
requirement of the competition. There is also incomplete information as well 
as monopoly power with the lawyers. The market structure either becomes a 
perfect monopoly or near to monopolistic competition where every supplier 
can charge a price that is different from the price of another supplier, and even 
for goods that are not much different from the goods supplied by others in the 
market. The market can also become like a tourist mode where the supplier 
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lands in the shop of another supplier and does not have the incentive to switch 
because switching is costly in terms of searching cost. This makes the supplier 
rigid in bargaining, and he charges a price where exclusion becomes much 
higher.  
 The addition of lawyers in the process of access to justice is a hurdle 
for the demand side. In reality, it is people who demand justice. Hence, they 
need someone who should settle their dispute without becoming a party in 
their disputes. In addition, they must not have monetary benefits attached to 
the disputes of people. The inclusion of lawyers also makes justice 
inaccessible as they have monetary benefits attached to the disputes of people. 
The longer the disputes, the higher the monetary benefits of lawyers. The 
higher the severity of disputes, the higher (inelastic) the demand for quick 
resolution of the disputes (land issues), and this, in turn, leads to higher 
monetary demand by lawyers. The compulsion/constraints of the litigant make 
the market attractive for lawyers and this makes access to justice costly. Based 
on the above discussion, we consider that the justice market is not competitive 
and exclusion is likely to be high. We are interested to find the equilibrium 
price of justice by collecting data from the field to test the following 
hypothesis. 
 
 3.1 Hypothesis: The price of justice is likely to be high in the non-
competitive market of justice leading to a higher level of exclusion. 
 
3.2 Data 
 We collected primary data to test the hypothesis with a convenient 
sampling technique.  The main objective of the questionnaire was to explore 
the price of justice (Monetary and Non-Monetary) in various types of courts. 
For this purpose, we carried out a descriptive and regression analysis.  
 
3.3 Econometric Model 
An econometric model allows the quantifying of the effect of various 
factors on the cost of justice. The following equation provides details of the 
econometric model we used for the purpose of regression.  
 CJi=α+β1HEXPE+ β2MAR + β3LLM + β4OEXP+ β5SENI + 
β6PROEX +ε  
 Where I vary from 1 to 5.  It takes a value of 1 for Civil court, 2 for 
District court, 3 for High court, 4 for Supreme Court, and 5 for 
Tribunal/services court. All variables are explained in Table 1 below.  
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Table 1. Description of the Variables 
Variables 
Abbrevi
ation 
Description 
Cost of 
Justice 
CJi 
The monetary cost of litigation in different types of courts in Rs. I vary 
with  
the type of court. 
Household 
Expenses 
HEXPE 
Household expenses faced by lawyers in Rs. (hundreds). It is expected  
that household expenses have a positive effect on the cost of justice. 
Marital 
Status 
MAR 
MAR is a dummy variable and takes the value of 1 if the lawyer is 
married,  
zero otherwise. We assume that a married lawyer charges a higher fee 
 than an unmarried lawyer. 
LLM LLM 
LLM is a dummy variable, and it takes the value of 1 if the lawyer holds 
 LLM degree, otherwise zero. It is expected that the lawyer having LLM 
 the degree will charge a higher fee. 
Other 
Experience 
EXP 
EXP is a dummy variable, and it takes the value of 1 if the lawyer has any 
 other experience like teaching, civil service, any other profession,  
otherwise zero. We assume that the lawyer having this type of  
experience charges a higher fee than an inexperienced lawyer. 
Status of 
lawyer 
SENI 
SENI is a dummy variable, and it takes the value of 1 if the lawyer is 
senior,  
otherwise zero. We assume that the fee of a senior lawyer is likely  
to be high. Hence, we expect a positive sign of cost with SENI. 
Professional 
Expenses 
PROEX 
Professional Expenses/case faced by lawyers in Rs. (hundreds). 
 It is expected that professional expenses have a positive impact on  
cost of justice. 
 
4.0 Results 
 In this section, firstly, we will provide an overview of the results. Then 
we will explain the various types of costs on various types of cases. 
Furthermore, we will explain how the average Pakistani is excluded from 
having access to justice by comparing the average earnings of an individual 
with the average cost of a case. Finally, we will conclude that without 
changingthe institutional infrastructure of the judicial system of Pakistan, we 
may not bring inclusiveness. 
 
4.1 An Overview of the Findings 
 Table 2 presents an overview of the various types of cost associated 
with the different levels of courts.  The table highlights the monetary and non-
monetary cost per the case in a court. 
 It is evident from the table that a litigant has to wait on an average of 
3 to 4 years to settle a case in the Civil/Magisterial court. In addition, during 
these 3 to 4 years, he has to appear 36 times before the court for the hearing 
of the case. It is also important that for 15 out of 36 times, the litigants observe 
postponement without hearing. This may happen due to the absence of lawyers 
or another party, absence of the judge or any other reason. In addition, after 
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waiting for 3 to 4 years, the litigants have to wait for another 3 to 4 years for 
the complete disposition of the case. During this time, he has to bear Rs.50,955 
in lieu of lawyers’ fee only. When we add up other costs such as the cost of 
transportation, lodging, and meal, the price of justice shifts upward.  
Table 2. Monetary and Non-Monetary Cost Per Case Across Courts  
Type of court 
The 
average 
fee 
charged 
by a 
lawyer 
(Rs.) 
Other 
costs 
per 
case 
(Rs.) 
The 
average 
duration 
of a case 
(in 
years) 
The 
average 
number 
of 
hearings 
per case 
The average 
number of 
postponement 
of hearings 
per case 
The 
total life 
of a case 
from 
start to 
end (in 
years) 
Civil/Magisterial 
Court 
50,955 47,244 3.3 36 15 6.4 
District 
Court/Court of 
Session 
63,054 56,625 2.7 26 11 5.9 
High Court 106,049 126,405 1.9 9 6 7.4 
Supreme Court 236,903 267,885 1.5 3 6 7.1 
Tribunals/Service 
Court 
70,358 54,793 2.1 16 5 2.9 
 
 We calculated the affordability of people from purchasing power, and 
we also took data from the household integrated economic survey (HIES). The 
data showed that the average citizen of Pakistan earns Rs.35,662 per month. 
Hence, if by chance he/she succumbs to a case in the civil court and magisterial 
court, he/she is less likely to bear the price which includes both the fee of the 
lawyer and other costs. Table 3  is constructed on the basis of data from HIES 
of 2016 (Published by Pakistan Bureau of Statistics). The table shows the 
monthly income and expenditures of the average Pakistani household. The 
overall average monthly income of a household is Rs.35,662.  The average 
monthly income of a household in rural areas is Rs.30,110, while the average 
monthly income of the urban household is Rs.45,283. On the other hand, the 
average monthly expenditures of the household are Rs.32,578. For rural 
household, it is Rs.27,414 and Rs.41,529 for the urban household. On the basis 
of this information, the average income of a household per year is Rs.427,944. 
In the same way, the average income of a household in rural and urban areas 
is Rs.361,321 and Rs. 543,396, consecutively. Furthermore, the average 
expenditures are Rs.328,968 per year for a rural household and Rs.498,348  
per year for an urban household. A rural household spends 91.04% of his 
income on daily expenses, while an urban household spends 91.70% of his 
income on daily expenses.  
 The leftover earnings of a household per year are Rs.37,008. For the 
rural and urban household, this amount of average saving per year is Rs.32,353 
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and Rs.45,048, respectively. In case a household, irrespective of being from 
rural or urban areas, faces a legal issue in Civil Court, he may not be able to 
afford the fee of a lawyer in this court which is Rs.50,954. We have mentioned 
before the minimum level of a lawyer’s fee in the Civil Courts. Therefore, we 
can say that access to justice is hard if not impossible in civil courts for an 
average Pakistani citizen. This shows that on average, every Pakistani has to 
either borrow or unload their assets to fight a case in courts. It is worth 
mentioning that the calculation is based on the assumption that a household 
faces legal issue once in a year. Thus, the calculation about exclusion will 
become misleading by relaxing on the supposed assumption. 
Table 3 Average Income and Expenditures of Households Per Month in 
Rs. 
 Total Rural Urban 
Average Income 35,662 30,110 45,283 
Average Expenditures 32,578 27,414 41,529 
 
 We also explained in details the types of cost associated with the cases 
in different courts.  
 
4.2 Average Fee of Lawyers Across Courts  
 Figure 2 shows the average fee a lawyer charges from the client for the 
cases in different courts and the other monetary costs. We can see that the 
average fee of a lawyer for cases in civil courts is Rs.50,955. The amount for 
a case increases to Rs.63,054 in District Courts/Magisterial Courts. The fee 
also increases to Rs.70,358 for a case in the Tribunal Court.  It further rises to 
Rs.106,049 for a case in High court. The fee per case takes multiple increases, 
and it reaches the figure of Rs.236,903 for a case in Supreme Court.  
Figure 2. Cost of Justice Across Courts 
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 One can observe that the highest amount of fee a lawyer charge is for 
a case in the Supreme Courts (SC).  A lawyer requests for Rs.236,903 per 
fighting a case in SC. This shows that the price of justice is very high in the 
Supreme Court. Hence, a higher proportion of the population is denied access 
to justice from the Supreme Court. Without bearing the fee of a lawyer, an 
average Pakistani is even unable to file a case in the Supreme Court. This also 
indicates how much deterrence an average Pakistani citizen might feel in a 
case where he has to seek justice from the Supreme Court. Therefore, an 
average Pakistani would knock the door of the SC in exceptional cases. On the 
other hand, access to justice is not an issue for the rich segment of society in 
Pakistan. They can easily afford the fee of a lawyer to file cases in the Supreme 
Court.1  
 The situation regarding excludability from access to justice in other 
courts is also not very satisfactory. The average fee of a lawyer in all types of 
courts is beyond the means of an average citizen of Pakistan.  
 Apart from the lower fee, there are other expenses which a client has 
to bear. This includes, but not limited to, the charges of documentation, 
photocopy, tip to the assistant lawyer and other junior staff of the courts, 
traveling, meal and food expenses, rental expenses for hiring accommodation, 
etc.  The data shows that the amount of such expenses for a case in the civil 
court is Rs.47,244. Likewise, the amount of such expenses for a case in the 
district court is  Rs.56,625, while for a case in Tribunal Court it is Rs.54,793. 
The level of such amount increases to Rs.126,405 for a case in High Court and 
reaches Rs.267,885 per case in SC.     
 It is noteworthy that Figure 2 shows the value of the average fee of 
lawyers. There are many types of lawyers and the value of the fee of each type 
of lawyer is different from the value of the fee of other types of lawyers. Table 
4 depicts the average fee of each type of lawyer.  
Table 4. Average Fee of Various Types of Lawyers Across Courts in Rs  
Types of 
lawyers\Types of 
Courts 
Senior Junior Part-time Full time Famous 
Civil courts/Magisterial 
Courts 
56,562 36,000 41,805 54,032 123,882 
District Courts/Court 
of Session 
65,916 55,368 49,264 67,476 293,058 
High Court 123,358 54,121 84,852 113,403 881,666 
Supreme Court 260,150 100,000 250,000 234,384 802,857 
Tribunals/ Service 
Courts 
73,205 44,375 72,857 69,483 260,000 
 
                                                          
1 This is the reason why the criticism of “justice for sale” arise against this judicial system. 
European Scientific Journal April 2019 edition Vol.15, No.11 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
12 
The general perception that a junior lawyer charges a fewer fee than 
the senior lawyer is supported by the data in our study. Experience pays to a 
lawyer who charges more than a junior lawyer. Therefore, when experience 
reaches the level of popularity, it pays much more. This can be seen from the 
table that the fee of a famous lawyer is much higher than the rest of the 
categories. 
 Additionally, there are some lawyers who practice part-time in the 
courts. The table shows that the fee of part-time lawyers on average is lower 
than the fee of full-time lawyers. In the Civil Court, full-time lawyers charge 
Rs.54,032 per case and part-time lawyers charge Rs.41,805 per case on 
average. Full-time lawyers and part-time lawyers charge on average Rs.67,476 
and Rs.49,264 respectively in District court/Session court. For the cases of the 
high court, full time and part-time lawyers charge on average Rs.113,403 and 
Rs.84,852 respectively. In the above-mentioned courts, the fee of part-time 
lawyers is lower than the fee of full-time lawyers. However, the situation is 
different for the cases in SC and Tribunals Court.  In the supreme court, the 
full-time and the part-time lawyer charges on average Rs.234,384 and 
Rs.250,000 respectively. Here, the fee of part-time lawyers is higher than the 
fee of full-time lawyers. One of the probable reasons is because part-time 
lawyers are more specialized in the cases of SC and they may not file cases in 
the lower courts. In the same manner, full-time lawyers charge lower than the 
part-time lawyers in Tribunal Courts. The average fee charged by the part-
time lawyers in the tribunals/services courts is Rs.72,857, while it is Rs.69,483 
for a full-time lawyer.  
 
4.3 Average Number of Hearings and Postponement Across Courts   
 A number of hearing is another determinant of monetary and non-
monetary cost. On every hearing, the client has to appear before the judge. The 
client also has to produce witnesses in some hearings. The presence of a 
lawyer is mandatory for each hearing. For each hearing, the client is likely to 
bear many expenses such as the expenses on travel, food, and refreshment. 
Likewise, he has to pay the expenses of people who come along with him. 
Sometimes, the client might pay compensation to witnesses, pay extra to 
please the lawyers (other than the fee), offer some amount for documentation 
and other expenses. We showed the detail of such cost in Figure 5.3.1, which 
depicts the number of hearings and postponements per case across different 
courts.  
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Figure 3. Average Number of Hearings and Postponement (court wise) 
 
 The client has to bear the highest number of hearing in Civil and 
Magisterial court. The second highest number of hearing a client has to bear 
is in the district court and the Court of Session followed by tribunal court.   
 In the District Court/Court of the session, the average number of 
hearing, as well as postponement, is 26 and 11, consecutively. However, in 
the tribunal court, the number of hearing is 16. The figure also shows that the 
lowest number of hearing (3) and postponement (6) is in the Supreme Court 
followed by the high court where the number of hearing is 9 and postponement 
is 6. This shows that in terms of monetary cost, the fee of a lawyer is highest 
in SC however; in terms of hearing this cost is low. We can claim that the 
higher monetary cost of a case in SC is canceled out by the low number of 
hearings (opportunity cost). On the other hand, the fee of lawyers is low in 
Civil Court/Magisterial court. Nevertheless, the low fee of a lawyer is 
canceled out by the higher number of hearing in the same courts. The low level 
of the number of hearing in the Supreme Court shows that poor people will 
prefer cases in supreme courts due to the opportunity cost in lower courts 
(Civil Court/Magisterial court and District court/Court of Session). Hence, 
excludability increases for a client who is rich, but a poor client in lower courts 
cannot spare time to attend each hearing. 
 
4.4  The Average Duration of a Case Across Courts   
 Figure 5.4.1 shows the average duration of a case across courts. We 
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by the District Courts. The average duration of a case in civil court is 3 years 
and 3 months, while in the district court it is 2 years and 9 months. However, 
the average duration of a case in courts other than these two types of courts is 
low. It is 1 year and 11 months in high court and 1 year and 6 months in SC. 
In tribunals court, it is 2 years and 1 month. We have mentioned earlier that it 
is not the average duration of a case that matters for clients in terms of non-
monetary cost. It is the number of total hearing that matters to them. The 
reason is that length,as well as the number of hearing, determines the 
opportunity cost of waiting or struggling to get justice. On one hand, the 
number of average duration of the cases in civil court is high. On the other 
hand, the number of hearing of a case in civil court is more in number than in 
other courts. This dual level of cost increases the excludability of people from 
access to justice. Hence, we can say that access to justice not only depends on 
the fee of a lawyer, but it also depends on the time, a number of hearing, and 
postponement of a case. The higher the cost of a case, the higher the 
excludability from access to justice.  
 
Figure 4. Average Duration of the Case 
 
4.5  Regression Analysis 
 In this section, we provided findings of the regression analysis. It has 
been discussed that it is the price of justice that plays a key role in excluding 
people from having access to justice. Hence, we calculated the price of justice 
by adding the direct and indirect cost incurred on a case in different courts. 
 CJi=α+β1HEXPE+ β2MAR + β3LLM + β4OEXP+ β5SENI + 
β6PROEX +ε   
 The results of the regressions are given in Table 5 below. 
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Table 5. Regression Results 
Variables 
Civil/Magistrate 
Courts 
District/Session  
Courts 
High 
court 
Supreme 
Court 
Tribunals/Service 
Courts 
Household 
expense 
0.00044 
(0.000296) 
0.00042**  
(0.00019) 
0.00051*   
(0.00022) 
0.00091 
(.00094) 
0.00078*** 
(0.00025) 
Marital 
status 
0.56            
(0.76) 
-0.018       
(0.412) 
0.20    
(0.35) 
0.71   
 (0.43) 
0.35             
 (0.34) 
LLM 
-0.18         
 (0.32) 
-0.60***   
(0.199) 
-0.61***   
(0.23) 
-1.06    
(0.66) 
-0.91***      
 (0.30) 
Other 
Experience 
-0.54          
(0.34) 
-0.059      
 (0.172) 
-0.34*   
(0.184) 
-0.41    
(0.30) 
-0.27            
 (0.24) 
Senior 
0.95           
 (0.81) 
0.25           
 (0.40) 
0.93*** 
(0.30) 
1.44***  
(0.43) 
0.73*           
 (0.38) 
Professional 
Expenses 
0.00035  
(0.00026) 
0.00028*   
(0.00015) 
0.000070   
(0.00017) 
-0.00039   
(0.00030) 
.000029   
 (.00025) 
CONS 
9.81***      
 (0.77) 
10.67***  
 (0.40) 
10.65***   
(0.32) 
11.11***   
(0.51) 
10.33***     
 (0.40) 
Number of 
Observation 
145 142 131 62 84 
R-square 0.11 0.10 0.20 0.23 0.24 
F-statistics 0.0025 0.0020 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 
Note: standard errors appear in parenthesis. Where * shows significance at 10%, ** 
shows significance at 5% and *** shows significance at 1%. 
   
 On an average, we found out the estimates per expectation. For 
example, the role of household expenses, senior and professional expenses, 
and LLM is significant. Household expenses significantly led to the cost of 
justice in district courts, high court, and tribunals. When there is an increase 
of Rs.100 in the household expenses of a lawyer, we expect an increase in the 
cost of justice by 0.04%, 0.05%, and 0.07% in the district court, high court, 
and Supreme Court respectively. Significantly, the coefficient of this variable 
is very small; there would be a reason why the lawyer charges a lump sum fee 
from his client. The status of a lawyer is also a determinant of the cost of 
justice and a dummy variable was being introduced to check the effect of the 
senior ship. Effect of the senior ship is significant in the high court, Supreme 
Court, and in tribunals. If the lawyer is senior, then the cost of justice will 
increase on average by 93%, 144%, and 73% in the high court, Supreme Court, 
and in tribunals respectively. Senior lawyers have a reputation among clients 
and courts. Therefore, this high charge of fees by a senior lawyer may be due 
to their goodwill. 
 However, we find the sign of LLM in contrast to what we assume. The 
probable reason is due to the limited market for a higher educated lawyer. The 
lawyers with LLB degree have a rush of cases on their desk because most of 
the litigants perceive that they may charge less.  Nevertheless, higher demand 
for their services makes them more known in the market. This may be one of 
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the reasons why they charge more. In the case of more qualified lawyers (in 
our study LLM), most of the clients perceive that they may charge more than 
an LLB lawyer. Therefore, they may have fewer cases on their tables. This is 
due to the reason that they may have undersized demand. As a result of this, 
the lawyers may charge less to get as many clients as they can and to broaden 
their goodwill for clients. This variable is significant in the district courts, high 
court, and in tribunals. If a lawyer possesses an LLM degree, then the cost of 
justice will decrease on average by 60% in district courts, 61% in the high 
court, and 91% in the Supreme Court. The lawyer’s fee is part of the cost of 
justice, hence it affects the cost of justice level. Professional expenses are 
significantly responsible for the cost of justice in the district courts only. If 
there is an increase of Rs.100 in professional expenses, then we expect an 
increase in the cost of justice for district court by 0.02%. 
 However, we do not find any role of marital status and other 
experience. Marital status of a lawyer is not significantly responsible for the 
cost of justice for any court. This means that whether a lawyer is married or 
single, his status will not affect the cost of justice. This is because the most 
important determinant of the lawyer’s fee is their experience in the relevant 
field (law practice). Consequently, the marital status of a lawyer does not 
affect his remuneration. Other experiences do not affect the cost of justice 
significantly except in the case of the high court. If a lawyer has such 
experience, he will charge 34% less than the lawyer who does not have such 
experience. The probable reason for his lower fee may be that he also has 
another source of income, so he charges low.  
 The main variable which plays a role in determining the cost of justice 
is household expenses, LLM, and senior. In the same manner, the signs of the 
coefficients are also in line with our expectation. However, the signs of LLM 
and other experiences are opposite to our expectations.  So, we can say that 
the factors which are significant are currently affecting the level of 
excludability because there is a change in the level of the price of justice. 
 
5.0 Conclusion 
 The findings of this study are based on descriptive analysis and 
regression analysis. The main findings of this study showed the average fee 
charged by the lawyer which is not in the affordability level of the citizens of 
Pakistan. On the basis of the HIES report, Pakistani’s consume more than 91% 
of their incomes and the saving behavior is very low in the nation. The 
remaining 9% of their income is not sufficient even for the lawyer’s fee. The 
minimum average fee across different types of courts is Rs.50,955. The rural 
household saves on average Rs.32,353 annually and the urban household saves 
on average Rs.45,028 annually. The saving of households is less than the fees 
charged by the lawyer. Therefore, one cannot afford even less expensive court 
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case. On average, a Pakistani national cannot afford even a lawyer’s fee, then 
how can he afford the remaining costs. Accordingly, this analysis gives the 
argument that there is a problem of over-exclusion in the judicial system of 
Pakistan. This over-exclusion indicates that the judicial system of Pakistan 
follows the neoclassical framework of economics.   
 
6.0  Policy Implications 
 As it is identified in this study, the fee of lawyers is very high and is 
beyond the affordability of a Pakistan citizen. More so, it is not just a fee for 
a lawyer, there are other charges like fee of court, charges of documentation, 
traveling expenses, expenses of food, and all other relevant charges are 
included in the cost of seeking justice. It is the duty of the government to 
ensure the delivery of justice to every citizen. In this context, the government 
should implement some rules to minimize this cost.  Pakistan National 
assembly passed an act named “cost of litigation Act 2017” to minimize the 
cost of litigation. This is appreciable, but it is only applicable in Islamabad. 
However, it should be applicable throughout the country. The state should also 
formulate policies to minimize the burden of courts. A huge amount of cases 
is pending in different courts of the country. This tendency is the main reason 
for the long litigation system. There should be alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) institutes (like Jirga, Panchayat within the constitutional and human 
rights framework) to minimize this burden. Moreover, the National assembly 
standing Committee on Law approved a bill “out-of-court settlements”. 
According to the bill, the trial courts will appoint the arbitrators with the 
consent of parties to settle their mutual disputes. The public should be aware 
of these ADRs so that the problem of exclusion can be avoided. With the 
appreciation of the ADRs, the fee of the lawyer will be excluded and the 
burden on the litigant will end. The role of the police is extremely vital in the 
process because they are the first respondent in most of the cases, therefore 
they playan effective role which affects the outcome in the judicial process. 
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